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This article examines the role of interveners before the UK Supreme Court.
Interveners are persons who, while neither appellant nor respondent, participate
in the litigation process and make submissions to the court in much the same way
that either of those parties would. Interveners assist judicial decision-making by
providing supplemental information that gives a broader economic and social
context to the legal issues in dispute. Through a comparative study of the
experience of intervention at the supreme courts of the United States and Canada,
this article seeks to provide insights as to how the practice of intervention might
develop at the UK Supreme Court in the years to come. It also identifies a number
of issues to lay a foundation for further scholarly study in the field.
In the first section, intervention is placed in a comparative context by looking
to the supreme courts of the United States and Canada. The second section
provides an overview of the purpose and procedure of intervention at the UK
Supreme Court. In the third section, a numerical analysis of intervention at
the UK Supreme Court since it began hearing cases in 2009 (with reference
to the House of Lords since 2005) identifies trends that may suggest future
developments. The conclusion sets out that intervention before the UK Supreme
Court offers a number of benefits if the process is carefully regulated.
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge; Barrister and Solicitor (Canada).
The author thanks Geoffrey Hunnisett and especially Simon Lafferty for helpful comments and
feedback but the standard disclaimer applies.
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2 Intervention in comparative context: United
States and Canada
Intervention is a standard feature of apex appellate courts in common law
jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, a tremendous number of special
interest groups participate in cases before the Supreme Court as amici curiae or
'friends of the court'. This form of intervention in the United States presents an
opportunity for interest groups to advance their policy preferences by influencing
the judiciary at the highest level in key cases. The Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States set out that individuals or groups who bring relevant
information to the attention of the judges, which might otherwise escape their
attention, are of 'considerable help' to the Supreme Court's decision-making
process.1 Rule 37 establishes that amici may participate in proceedings by filing
legal briefs (and occasionally making oral arguments) with the consent of the
parties or, if consent is not forthcoming, by leave of the Supreme Court.
In terms of their substantive content, legal briefs set out arguments to
persuade the judges to reach the outcome desired by each group. Legal arguments
are often supported by reference to scientific evidence derived from studies
funded by the amicus curiae or citations to scholarly publications in a form
resembling a 'Brandeis brief', named after Louis Brandeis who, as a young lawyer,
referred to social science evidence in arguing constitutional cases. 2
It is clear that interest groups see value in intervening. An astonishing
597 legal briefs were filed by amici curiae in the 85 cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 2012. According to my study of the
docket database, amici participated in more than three-quarters of the total
number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, with 65 percent of those
cases involving a significant number of interventions. 3 Interest groups included
non-governmental organisations, corporations, academics, private citizens, and
participants from all three branches of government. For example, in American
Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, adopted l2january 2010, effective
16 February 2010, <http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf> [accessed
4 February 2013].
2 M Rustad & T Koenig, 'The Supreme Court and junk social science: selective distortion in amicus
briefs', (1993-94) 72 N Car L R 91,104-106.
Out of the 66 Supreme Court of the United States cases decided in 2012 that included
legal briefs filed by amici curiae, 43 involved five or more amici: see Supreme Court of the
United States, 'Docket system, <http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx> [accessed 4
February 2013]. Throughout this article 'significant' refers to cases with five or more interveners.
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Tradition Partnership, Inc v Bullock,4 a case in which the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a state law restricting corporate donations to political
candidates, legal briefs were filed by 17 different amici, including, among others,
freedom of speech organisations, several US senators, a group of retired judges,
a law school, two private citizens, and the State of New York.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the flurry of intervention activity at the Supreme
Court of the United States has produced a cottage industry of specialist amicus
curiae lawyers. The Washington DC office of one international law firm markets
its intervention services by noting that amici curiae can play a pivotal role in
Supreme Court decision-making, pointing to one tax case in which the judges
'rejected the positions of both the Government and the taxpayer, and accepted
the solution proffered by [our] amicus client'.5
While the Supreme Court of Canada hears from considerably fewer interven-
ers than its United States counterpart, intervention is still a well-utilised process
in that appellate court. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada require any
person interested in making submissions to apply for intervention status and set
out why their submissions will be useful and different from those of the other
parties. 6 According to my analysis of Supreme Court judgments, 221 interveners
participated in the 75 cases decided in 2012. Interveners participated in 60 per-
cent of the total number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, with 40 percent
of those cases involving a significant number of interventions. While the types
of interest groups appearing before the Supreme Court of Canada are broadly
similar to those appearing before the Supreme Court of the United States, there
tend to be fewer interventions by organisations having express political leanings.
Canadian interveners are often organisations claiming to represent a particular
social collective, such as an occupational class. For example, in Alberta (Educa-
tion) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright),8 a case considering
whether photocopying of copyrighted materials by a teacher fell within the 'fair
dealing' exemption of the copyright statute, 19 interveners participated in the pro-
4 Supreme Court of the United States, Docket no 11-1179, <http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1179.htm> [accessed 4 February 2013].
Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 'Appellate & Supreme Court, <http://www.steptoe.com/practices-
37.html> [accessed 4 February 2013].
6 Rules 55-57 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, <http://laws-lois.just
ice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2002-156/page-17.htmlah-68> [accessed 4 February 2013].
Out of the 45 Supreme Court of Canada cases decided in 2012 that involved an intervention, 18
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ceedings including associations of authors, publishers, students, and teachers.
Table 1: Comparison of intervention activity at the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Canada over the 2012 calendar year.9
Supreme Court Supreme Court
of the United of Canada
States
Total number of judgments decided 85 75
(A)
Number of judgments involving 66 45
interveners (B)
Percentage of total judgments 77.6% 60 %
decided involving interveners (B/A)
Number of judgments involving a 43 18
significant number of interveners (C)
Percentage of total judgments 50.6% 24%
involving a significant number of
interveners (C/A)
Percentage of judgments involving 65.2% 40%
interveners having a significant
number (C/B)
Total number of interventions in all 597 221
judgments decided (D)
Mean interventions per judgment 7.0 2.9
decided (D/A)
Scholarly study of intervention is well-developed in the legal and political
science literature of both the United States and Canada. Caldeira and Wright
argue that the diverse range of interest groups represented at the Supreme Court
of the United States make the Court 'very much a representative institution'.10
Others have found interveners to have a less favourable effect on courts,
arguing that interveners distort social science evidence and generate questionable
research specifically geared to their legal briefs. In one study, Rustad and Koenig
9 Decimal places have been truncated and not rounded in all calculations.
1 GA Caldeira &J RWright, Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: who participates, when, and






























Figure 1: Comparison of intervention activity at the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Canada over the 2012 calendar year.
observe that scientific evidence put before the Supreme Court of the United
States through amicus curiae participation is not subject to the same procedural
safeguards, such as cross-examination, as ordinary evidence introduced by the
litigation parties.1'
Collins has published extensively on special interest groups appearing before
the Supreme Court of the United States. In his book, Friends of the Supreme Court:
Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Collins draws upon an extensive
dataset of special interest participation in Supreme Court cases to evaluate the
influence of amici curiae on judicial decision-making. 12 Collins demonstrates
that amicus legal briefs affect judicial policy choices by providing important
contextual information, often in the form of scientific evidence, and arguments
to supplement what is provided by the litigation parties. It is also interesting that
" Rustad & Koenig, above n 2, 95.
12 PM Collins, Friends of the Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making (2008). See also P
M Collins, 'Friends of the court: examining the influence of amicus curiae participation in US
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intervention tends to increase the number of dissenting opinions as the appellate
process becomes transformed into a public-policy battleground. 13  Collins's
conclusions are supported by other large-scale empirical studies, such as one
conducted by Kearney and Merrill that documents an explosion in the number of
amici curiae briefs filed at the Supreme Court over a half-century.14
In Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada,
Brodie analyses various kinds of groups acting as interveners and their relation-
ship with the Supreme Court of Canada.15 Brodie theorises that the Supreme
Court supports its activist policy-making agenda through a mutually beneficial
relationship with certain groups who intervene to provide a foundation for pre-
existing judicial policy preferences. Alarie and Green's detailed statistical study
shows that intervention at the Supreme Court of Canada matters: the presence
of an intervener boosts the likelihood of outcome success in favour of the liberal
or conservative orientation of the interest group and 'all judges are susceptible to
intervener influence in a statistically significant way'.16 Echoing the findings of
Collins, Alarie and Green take the view that the Supreme Court encourages in-
tervention when it seeks to better understand the context of its decision-making
through additional information. The supplemental role of interveners and the
increase in intervention activity over the past several years are positive develop-
ments so far.1
3 Intervention at the UK Supreme Court: purpose
and procedure
One of the principal reasons third parties are permitted to intervene in proceed-
ings at the UK Supreme Court is that it is in the public interest for them to do so.
This can be understood in at least two senses. First, it is in the public interest that
the dispute at hand is resolved in a way that best serves the parties affected by the
decision. Second, it is in the public interest that appellate courts make decisions
based on the best available information. In this sense, the public is not just those
1 See PM Collins, 'Amici curiae and dissensus on the US Supreme Court, (2008) 5 J of Empirical
Legal Studies 143.
14 j M Kearney & T W Merrill, 'The influence of amicus curiae briefs on the Supreme Court',
(1999-2000)148 U of Penn L R 743.
* I Brodie, Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (2002).
16 B R D Alarie & AJ Green, 'Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: accuracy, affiliation,




who are immediately affected by a decision, but the citizenry as a whole given
that the law decided by the upper courts binds the lower courts (and the popu-
lace). The underpinning rationale is the ability of interveners to furnish the court
with information that it might otherwise not have.
Although a laudable principle, the public interest rationale is not without
potential problems. In the modern era, judges may be connected to pressure and
agenda-driven groups. There is a risk, even if minimal, that the impartiality of
judges could be drawn into question as a result of these connections. Within the
operation of the rule against bias, it must be considered whether a perception of
bias could arise as it 'is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done'.18 This is not a fanciful risk as Re Pinochetl9
demonstrates. In that case, the House of Lords decided that its judgment had
to be set aside because of Lord Hoffmann's links to Amnesty International,
which had intervened. Moreover, judges might not only have direct links with
interveners-that may or may not qualify as 'bias'-they are likely to be exposed
to a growing number of interveners in hearing their cases. Decisions in past cases
may give rise to perceptions of a given disposition towards certain interveners or
other pressure groups.
Extra-judicial connections are important as well. Re Pinochet stands as
a precedent for a formal extra-judicial connection: Lord Hoffmann was a
director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Limited.20 However,
adjudicators may meet members of pressure groups in many informal contexts
(at dinner or receptions, for example). 21 These cases are less than straightforward
because the rule against bias might not apply in such a case. As a result, English
substantive law on bias may have to develop in order to accommodate the issues
emerging with increasing number of interveners at the UK Supreme Court.
The procedure for intervening at the UK Supreme Court is governed by the
Supreme Court Rules 2009. In particular, Rule 26(1) states that:
After permission to appeal has been granted by the Court or a notice
of appeal has been filed, any person and in particular-
1 R v Sussex justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924]1KB 256, 259.
' [2000] 1 AC 119.
2()Although Amnesty international consists of numerous (technically distinct) legal entities, they
were treated as one and the same legal person for the purposes of the appeal: ibid, 139 (Lord Goff
of Chieveley).
21 A possibility touched upon by DeaneJ in the Australian case of Webb v The Queen, (1994)181 CLR
41, 74.
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(a) any official body or non-governmental organization seeking to
make submissions in the public interest,
(b) any person with an interest in proceedings by way of judicial
review,
(c) any person who was an intervener in the Court below or whose
submissions were taken into account under rule 15,
may apply to the Court for permission to intervene in the appeal.22
The rule is drafted widely to include 'any person, albeit with a special emphasis
on those with an 'interest in proceedings' in the judicial review context, or who
seek to make submissions 'in the public interest'. The Supreme Court is left with
discretion under Rule 26(1) to self-regulate as to who may intervene.
A recent decision of the UK Supreme Court, R (on the application of Prudential
plc) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax,23 offers an interesting study of inter-
vention. The case concerned the application and scope of legal advice privilege
to advice given by accountants on a tax avoidance scheme. Five interveners par-
ticipated in the case: The Law Society, The Bar Council, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants, AIPPI UK Group, and the Legal Services Board. Prudential was un-
usual because the majority and minority judges 'agree[d] what the common law
is or should be if the issue is treated as one of principle'.24 What they differed
on was how that principle should be applied. The majority relied heavily on the
arguments advanced by interveners, while the minority fashioned their dissent
almost exclusively from first principles.
While there were interveners on either side of the dispute in Prudential,
those who supported the respondent did so on the ground that the 'effect of
extending [legal advice privilege] would involve a potentially nuanced policy
decision [...] which is therefore best left to Parliament'.25 Yet it is clear that
the minority had no such qualms about the UK Supreme Court extending legal
advice privilege. Lord Sumption stated that 'we are not here concerned with
social or economic issues or other issues of macro-policy which are classically the
22 Emphasis added. Rule 15 provides that parties (like those in Rule 26) may make written
submissions to the Court in support of an application for permission to appeal.
23 [2013] UKSC 1.
24 Ibid, para 140 (Lord Clarke, diss).
25 Jbid, para 28 (Lord Neuberger). The same point is alluded to by Lord Reed in paragraph 101:
'More fundamentally, it is necessary to give consideration to the respective roles, in relation to
the development of this area of the law, of the courts, the executive and the legislature.'
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domain of Parliament'.26 The division between the majority and minority reveals
a problem of characterisation: what is to be considered a social or economic
issue or an issue of macro-policy best left to Parliament? A divisive intervener
could leverage the potential in characterising an issue one way over another.
This is particularly problematic where, due to time constraints or the availability
of information, there is no counterargument to be heard (e.g., from another
intervener).27 Moreover, in some cases, extensive social or economic evidence
put before the court by an intervener may contribute to judicial comfort in
deciding issues traditionally seen as the domain of Parliament.
It remains to be seen how the UK Supreme Court will regulate the process of
intervention. Judicial discretion in the broad wording of Rule 26(1) provides the
Supreme Court with sufficient flexibility in developing its approach to ensure that
it can obtain important and relevant information from interveners. The newly
established Supreme Court has the opportunity to charter a course which can
be informed by the experience of other jurisdictions: although each has its own
intervention rules and different constitutional roles for its respective supreme
court, the United States and Canada both offer lessons in how interveners can
be fruitful contributors to judicial decision-making at the appellate level if the
process is sufficiently regulated. Striking a balance between the benefits offered
by interveners while avoiding the problems they present is not an easy task, which
is why more work needs to be done to better explore intervention before the
Supreme Court.
4 Intervention at the UK Supreme Court: the
numbers
While there is much less intervention activity at the UK Supreme Court compared
to the supreme courts of the United States and Canada, the findings demonstrate
that intervention has generally increased over the past eight years, with a signif-
icant expansion following the creation of the Supreme Court as an institution
distinct from the House of Lords.28
26 Ibid, para 131 (Lord Sumption, diss).
27 See the discussion by M Fordham, 'Public interest interventions in the Supreme Court:
ten virtues', <http://www.blackstonechambers.com/document.rm?id= 331> [accessed 4 February
2013] 2.
A note on the methodology: I counted cases and interveners in the judgments of the UK Supreme
Court appearing on its website <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/index.html>
[last accessed 4 February 2012] in the calendar years 2009 through to the end of 2012 and in
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Table 2: Comparison of intervention activity at the UK Supreme Court from its
establishment in 2009 through to the end of the 2012 calendar year.
2009 2010 2011 2012
UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC
Total number of judgments
decided (A)
Number of judgments involving
interveners (B)
Percentage of total judgments
decided involving interveners
(B/A)
Number of judgments involving a
significant number of interveners
(C)
Percentage of total judgments
involving a significant number of
interveners (C/A)
Percentage of judgments
involving interveners having a
significant number (C/B)
Total number of interventions in
all judgments decided (D)
Mean interventions per judgment
decided (D/A)
17 58 60 63
6 17 24 23
35.2% 29.3% 40.0% 36.5%
1 0 0 0
5.8% 0% 0% 0%
16.6% 0% 0% 0%
13 21 46 33
0.76 0.36 0.77 0.52
For example, at its peak in 2011, 40 percent of the Supreme Court's cases involved
at least one intervener as compared to the House of Lords in 2005 where only
12 percent of its cases involved intervention. From its inception in 2009 to the
end of 2012, the Supreme Court heard more than 35 percent of its cases in the
the judgments of the House of Lords appearing on its website <http://www.publications.parl
iament.uk/pa/ld/djudgmt.htm> [last accessed 4 February 2012] in the calendar years 2005
through to the end of 2009. Case listings were also supplemented with reference to the electronic
subscription service Westlaw UK <http://www.westlaw.co.uk/> [last accessed 4 February 2012].
Each neutral citation was counted as a single case and interveners were counted when they
appeared on the header of the judgment as having made oral arguments or written submissions.
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Figure 2: Comparison of intervention activity at the UK Supreme Court from its
establishment in 2009 through to the end of the 2012 calendar year.
presence of an intervener in contrast to less than 24 percent at the House of Lords
in the period from 2005 to the cessation of its judicial function in 2009: a relative
increase of intervention in the total judicial case-load of nearly 50 percent.
Despite the increasing incidence of intervention in cases before the UK
Supreme Court, there remain few cases with a significant number of interveners.
During the period studied, there was only a single case involving at least five
interveners, being the 2009 judgment of the Supreme Court in R v Governing
Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS and others.29 In that case, the
Court was called upon to consider who is Jewish' for the purpose of deciding
whether an admissions policy at a Jewish secondary school infringed the Race
Relations Act 1976. Interveners in the case included the Board of Deputies
of British Jews, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Secretary
of State for Children, Schools and Families, the United Synagogue, and the
British Humanist Association. Lord Phillips' judgment referred to extensive
[2009] UKSC 15.
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social science information presented to the Supreme Court, including statistics
on denominations of persons identifying as Jewish and the accepted process of
conversion in the context of a child who was refused admission to the school on
the basis that he was not recognised as Jewish by the Orthodox denomination.30
Table 3: Comparison of intervention activity at the UK House of Lords from 2005
through to the cessation of its judicial function in 2009.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
UKHL UKHL UKHL UKHL UKHL






















74 56 58 74 45
9 15 18 22 9
12.1% 26.7% 31.0% 29.7% 20.0%
0 0 0 0 0
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
12 22 22 28 13
0.16 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.29
The lack of cases with a significant number of interveners stands in sharp
contrast to the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, where key cases
0 Ibid, paras 3-6, 40.
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commonly attract a large number of interveners. However, there may be a change
on the horizon as indicated by the Supreme Court's first delivered case in 2013 of
Prudential, discussed above.
Interestingly, there is also a correlation between the size of the panel hearing
the case and the presence of interveners and their number. A larger panel size
may be a way for the UK Supreme Court to send a signal, even if passively, to
potential interveners of the importance of the case. When the Supreme Court
sat with seven judges, for example, the likelihood of an intervention jumped
by nearly five percent. The average number of interveners in cases with seven
judges also increased. When nine judges sat on a case, the effect was even more
significant: the likelihood of an intervention on a nine-judge panel jumped by
nearly 50 percent, with an average of 1.53 interveners in such cases compared to
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Table 4: Comparison of aggregate intervention activity at the UK House of Lords
from 2005 through to the cessation of its judicial function in 2009 with the
aggregate intervention activity at the UK Supreme Court from its establishment
in 2009 through to the end of the 2012 calendar year.
2005-2009 2009-2012
UKHL UKSC
Total number of judgments decided 307 198
(A)
Number of judgments involving 73 70
interveners (B)
Percentage of total judgments 23.7% 35.3%
decided involving interveners (B/A)
Number of judgments involving a 0 1
significant number of interveners (C)
Percentage of total judgments 0% 0.5%
involving a significant number of
interveners (C/A)
Percentage of judgments involving 0% 1.4%
interveners having a significant
number (C/B)
Total number of interventions in all 97 113
judgments decided (D)


































Figure 4: Comparison of aggregate intervention activity at the UK House of
Lords from 2005 through to the cessation of its judicial function in 2009 with the
aggregate intervention activity at the UK Supreme Court from its establishment
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Table 5: Comparison of intervention activity in seven- and nine-judge panels at
the UK Supreme Court from 2009 through to the end of the 2012 calendar year
with the overall numbers from the UK Supreme Court during the same period.




Total number of judgments 37 13 198
decided (A)
Number of judgments involving 15 11 70
interveners (B)
Percentage of total judgments 40.5% 84.6% 35.3%
decided involving interveners
(B/A)
Number of judgments involving a 0 1 1
significant number of interveners
(C)
Percentage of total judgments 0% 7.6% 0.5 %
involving a significant number of
interveners (C/A)
Percentage of judgments 0% 9.0% 1.4%
involving interveners having a
significant number (C/B)
Total number of interventions in 32 20 113
all judgments decided (D)
Mean interventions per judgment 0.86 1.53 0.57
decided (D/A)
5 Conclusion
As this study demonstrates, intervention at the UK Supreme Court is emerging
as an important part of the litigation process. Where this may lead is not entirely
clear. What can be drawn from the comparative and numerical analysis is that
intervention has the capacity to enrich the judicial decision-making process.
However, there remains a risk of transforming the highest judicial institution
31
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into a forum for specialised interests if this tool is not carefully utilised. An
immoderate approach may encourage the Supreme Court to make decisions that
are better made by more representative institutions and could threaten public
perceptions of judicial impartiality.
Further scholarly study of intervention at the UK Supreme Court, both
qualitative and quantitative, is necessary to fully understand the process as it
develops and more data becomes available. Who are interveners and what are
their policy preferences? What kinds of cases tend to attract intervention? Why
is there an overall trend toward increased intervention? What are the effects
of intervention in influencing judicial choice? Is the evidence presented by
interveners reliable or does it tend to distort the decision-making process? Is the
litigation process, as traditionally understood, in a state of flux? These questions
are all worthy of consideration. It is hoped that this study provides a useful
starting point to answering these questions as well as stimulating further debate





































Figure 5: Comparison of intervention activity in seven- and nine-judge panels at
the UK Supreme Court from 2009 through to the end of the 2012 calendar year
with the overall numbers from the UK Supreme Court during the same period.
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